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Abstract
Disruptive innovations of the last few decades, such as smart cities and Industry 4.0, 
were made possible by higher integration of physical and digital elements. In today’s 
pervasive cyber-physical systems, connecting more devices introduces new vulner-
abilities and security threats. With increasing cybersecurity incidents, cybersecurity 
professionals are becoming incapable of addressing what has become the greatest 
threat climate than ever before. This research investigates the spectrum of risk of a 
cybersecurity incident taking place in the cyber-physical-enabled world using the 
VERIS Community Database. The findings were that the majority of known actors 
were from the US and Russia, most victims were from western states and geographic 
origin tended to reflect global affairs. The most commonly targeted asset was infor-
mation, with the majority of attack modes relying on privilege abuse. The key fea-
ture observed was extensive internal security breaches, most often a result of human 
error. This tends to show that access in any form appears to be the source of vulnera-
bility rather than incident specifics due to a fundamental trade-off between usability 
and security in the design of computer systems. This provides fundamental evidence 
of the need for a major reevaluation of the founding principles in cybersecurity.
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1 Introduction
The Internet of Things (IoT) revolution led to an exponential increase in the num-
ber of physical things that are connected to the Internet [23]. IoT and other con-
nected data technologies, i.e. cyber-physical systems (CPS), thrive to enhance exist-
ing infrastructure and operational systems. CPS can bring a number of benefits to 
citizens, business and governments. However, securing these systems in a piecemeal 
mode has proven a monumental challenge [5]. With the continuous implementa-
tion of time- and safety-critical applications of CPS, the security risks and costs of 
potential attacks will continue to grow. As core components of safety-critical infra-
structures, CPS, e.g. smart grid, have become an attractive target for cyberattacks. 
To illustrate, hackers sabotaged the control system of Ukraine’s electric grid causing 
power outage affecting about  230,000 people. Without effective security controls, 
attackers are potentially able to access a CPS, sometimes using Internet connected 
devices as an entry gateway, causing damage from long distances [17].
Cybersecurity has rapidly become an issue of major contemporary relevance 
in computer science. With cybersecurity incidents increasing every year, the state 
of the art has only become more apparent as deficient [12, 30, 31]. It is important 
that whilst the trend does appear to be an increasing frequency and seriousness of 
cybersecurity incidents, it remains an area of study which is often misunderstood 
and highly controversial. In many cases, cybersecurity technologies, data and heu-
ristic methods are proprietary and unavailable for academic observation or use for 
free by those less economically able but whom the literature recognises as being the 
most vulnerable to cybersecurity incidents [6]. Thus, the long-term sustainability of 
day-to-day computing technologies is questionable. For example, Heartbleed [13], 
a vulnerability potential affecting the whole Internet, could not have been avoided 
because even a small human error can have catastrophic consequences. In that case, 
it was a short-spanned programming error many years earlier, but its effect was cata-
strophic. The likelihood of some influence on security leading to a breach is a matter 
of chance resulting from the methods used in computer security, primarily the heu-
ristic nature of computer security software.
The majority of cybersecurity incident datasets are proprietary, often coupled 
with the added caveat that when vulnerabilities are discovered they are either kept 
secret or are only shared within acutely technical circles. Consequently, before and 
during the vulnerability discovery phase there is an opportunity presented for poten-
tially silent zero-day exploitation by attackers who could be extremely capable.
It can therefore be argued that in reality, the focus is not on the nature and con-
tent of an exploit specifically, but how it is able to weave between computer secu-
rity structures to achieve the end goal of exploitation. Thus, the objective of this 
research is to understand the risks and niceties of the largest publicly available 
dataset of cybersecurity incidents with the overall aim to identify patterns of impor-
tance among the dataset, particularly ones that are CPS specific. This is achieved by 
studying the characteristics of the VERIS Community Database (VCDB) of cyber-
security incidents. VCDB is the most accepted open-source dataset for cybersecu-
rity incidents in industry, academia and government [16]. It records a number of 
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cybersecurity incident features, some of which are attack mode, actor type, impact, 
victim type, timeline and prose summaries often accompanied by a hard reference 
to a source. The dataset, as of writing, now contains about 7000 unique incidents 
gleaned from real-life data breaches over a period of 12  years [26]. The existing 
VCDB dataset has extensive fielding, which is appropriate in degree to extensively 
critically analyse the mechanisms of cybersecurity incidents. Other datasets are too 
specific and do not provide a temporal dimension to security incidents.
The general trend within cybersecurity is for each organisation to take a different 
stance by using a different analytics platform to record cybersecurity incidents and 
data breaches. Indeed, cybersecurity risk analytics has become a lucrative venture 
[15]. This is unhelpful because not only is the data relating to cybersecurity inci-
dents not reaching a central information repository which other users can benefit 
from, the organisations themselves may implement means and models which are not 
particularly effective nor accurate.
The motivation for this research is to analyse in detail the largest and most com-
prehensive dataset available for cybersecurity incidents in order to understand a 
greater depth of context to cybersecurity incidents. The objective is to, by Monte 
Carlo simulation, map a range of possibilities for future attack modes. An added 
motivation is to create a model for a repeatable approach to analysis of this dataset 
(VCDB) and other cybersecurity incident datasets. The model for the approach in 
this research is repeatable in other research studies.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Sect. 2 gives the key threats to CPS 
and the motivation behind this research. Section 3 covers recent studies that attempt 
to analyse data breaches. Section  4 details our methodology for feature analysis 
and the Monte Carlo simulation. Section 5 details the results of risk modelling. In 
Sect. 6, the results are thoroughly analysed with respect to frequency, increasing rate 
and loss, the principles of least privilege, human error and criticality. Section 7 con-
cludes the paper and identifies future work avenues.
2  CPS security threats and motivation
The cybersecurity risks in CPS have become a serious concern for security profes-
sionals. This is particularly true as CPS is increasingly deployed in critical infra-
structure, manufacturing and everyday life such as building control, medical devices 
and smart grid. When a connected endpoint is breached, a backdoor into other parts 
of the network is created. Hence, the result of malicious attacks can have severe con-
sequences on human lives, business productivity and national security. In the follow-
ing, we highlight some of the key security threats to CPS; we refer interested readers 
to the following works [3, 5, 9, 20, 32] for an extensive treatment of the topic.
Industry is driven by functional requirements with little attention to security. 
The massive growth in the number of CPS connected devices increases the attack 
vector. Most of these devices have long lifespans. Many devices do not get enough 
security updates; some never get updated at all. This is partially due to the fact that 
a CPS device has been managed by operational technology teams rather than IT 
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departments leading to excluding them from the proactive and coordinated efforts 
that are deployed to secure enterprise systems.
CPS device are at risk of being compromised for various reasons. Some, often 
heuristic, attacks could hijack connected devices and turn them into email serv-
ers for mass spam, use them as botnets for executing DDoS (Distributed Denial of 
Service) attacks or simply cause interruption to business processes. The motivation 
behind these attacks could be financial, e.g. tamper with a physical utility meter or 
inject false data to misinform the production process causing monetary loss. Many 
attacks are also motivated by political reasons such as interrupting power supply as 
part of cyber warfare.
The limited computation, communication and processing resources of common 
CPS devices make the application of classical data encryption and secure communi-
cation protocols impractical. Hence, many CPS devices do not encrypt communica-
tion between devices and with the cloud servers. Secure communication protocols 
must be used to protect against unsafe communication. More recently, with the ris-
ing popularity of the zero trust security model, micro-segmentation is used to assign 
CPS devices to a separate network to create private communication that keeps the 
transmitted data secure.
One of the common CPS vulnerabilities is the use of default passwords and device 
misconfiguration. Until today, most devices are shipped with default passwords 
and settings. Attackers can use this knowledge to brute force into these devices. 
Weak credentials put both the user and their business at risk of being susceptible to 
attacks. After gaining access to CPS devices, attackers can establish remote sessions 
and use them to monitor the owners without their knowledge. Furthermore, attackers 
can use CPS devices, either through their IP addresses or built-in GPS chip, to find 
a user’s physical location. Installing a VPN to secure a CPS can keep the IP address 
private. As CPS connects the physical and virtual worlds, unsecured devices which 
for instance are part of a home security system, when compromised can cause mas-
sive risks to personal and business safety. One of the examples of remote access 
attacks is hijacking self-driving vehicles and even asking the owners to pay a ransom 
to return control of the vehicle, machine or medical device.
In conclusion, the plethora of different CPS devices brings various vulnerabili-
ties. New trends such as the use of artificial intelligence (AI) and automation intro-
duce a new vector of security threats to CPS. In modern AI-enabled CPS, simple 
coding errors can bring down the entire infrastructure that it was controlling. The 
human factor plays a key role in securing CPS; this threat can be resolved through 
educating individuals using or managing a CPS. Education goes beyond technical 
knowledge of how to secure a system to cover awareness about the impact of CPS 
and security attacks, which could be the difference between having a secure network 
and a security breach. The scale and complexity of a CPS system makes it expensive 
and time-consuming to secure CPS infrastructure. Security threats for CPS are only 
expected to intensify as more targets are becoming available. With the rise of Indus-
try 4.0, machine phishing will become a serious concern to the smart manufacturing 
sector. Manufacturers and other CPS users will have to invest more in addressing the 
serious security vulnerabilities and threats. This paper is set to identify imminent 
security threats to CPS and beyond. We believe that understanding the sources of 
2647
1 3
Threats on the horizon: understanding security threats in…
threats is the first line of defence against such risks as it helps organisations imple-
ment their information security strategies, make well-informed governance deci-
sions and mitigates risks at an early stage.
3  Related work
There is a recognised sparsity of complete incident datasets for cybersecurity [19]. 
Comparisons of various datasets have been performed, but this has not included a 
detailed consideration of the underlying scientific and social mechanisms of cyber-
security incidents [14]. The demand for research conducting data breach analysis is 
very well recognised; nonetheless, there appears to be a general sparsity within the 
literature of such works, particularly more searching research [1].
There are very recent and rigorous research papers which analyse data security 
breaches [4]. The authors of [31] ascertain the existing technological capability to 
mitigate insider threats within computer security systems by way of a mixed-method 
systematic review. This research does not take into account the malicious insider. 
In [21], a systematic literature review and meta-analysis on artificial intelligence in 
penetration testing and vulnerability assessment is conducted.
Such research efforts do not investigate the wider temporal dimensions of these 
breaches but instead focus on common mechanisms. There is clearly a demand for 
research investigating wider perspectives. This motivates our research to understand 
the nature of security threats so that new technologies can be developed around 
potential further findings.
4  Feature analysis and Monte Carlo simulation methods
The approach in this study was complex and time-consuming owing to the need to 
manually sort data. Data was downloaded from the vz-risk/vcdb [26] repository in 
JSON format and the schema analysed using purpose-built software. A software 
package “VerisDB Analyst” was created to parse that JSON data and present it both 
in a web application and a REST API over HTTP [29]. The analysis conducted by 
the application was performed through MapReduce functions [11], which appear 
in and are explained by [27]. VerisDB Analyst is backed by a MongoDB database. 
In this particular study, the software was tested against MongoDB Atlas (the cloud 
offering of MongoDB) and was tested against a local installation. The primary rea-
son for this was to assess connection and database drop-outs.
The VerisDB Analyst application contains the MapReduce function in Algo-
rithm 1. That MapReduce algorithm was implemented in respect of each type of 
property [27]. The algorithm was slightly tailored to the properties in the VERIS 
schema [26] because it does not presently adhere to the JSON specification [7] 
since some keys and values are arbitrarily stored in sub-objects and property 
names. This posed challenges for parsing the data, because the data heirarchy was 
sophisticated by those problems. As a direct consequence, the Javascript used to 
make VerisDB Analyst is not optimal. It could be argued that data should have 
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been pre-corrected, but this approach was not taken because VERIS is open-
source and it was more appropriate to raise it as an issue with the Verizon RISK 
team [28].
Algorithm 1 MapReduce Algorithm derived from [11]
1: function MapProps(jsonAray)
2: mappedObject = {}
3: for jsonObject ∈ jsonArray do
4: p ← convert(jsonObject.prop)
5: p → mappedObject
6: end for
7: return mappedObject
8: end function
9: function ReduceProps(jsonMap)
10: reducedObject = {}
11: for jsonObject ∈ jsonMap do
12: key ← (jsonObject.key)
13: value ← Σ (jsonObject.prop)
14: keys[] ← key
15: values[] ← value
16: keys, values → reducedObject
17: end for
18: return reducedObject
19: end function
The purpose of Algorithm 1 was to extract only the relevant data for the pur-
poses of summarising the cybersecurity incident data. Only the overlying trends 
were important, not the structure or metadata of the database state itself (in this 
case a JSON tree). The algorithm was performed in Javascript ES7 in node.js 
8.8.1. The algorithm returned computations in respect of whole objects summa-
rised from the whole JSON database as stored on MongoDB within 2441 ms on 
an Intel i3-4030 single-threaded 8GB RAM on a commodity HP G6 laptop re-
purposed as a server which runs the LXD container platform. The application 
used for statistical analysis was held in a container with MongoDB 3.4 installed 
locally. Given that the JSON database is 19 MB and was processed around 5 times 
through MongoDB aggregation queries, this is a satisfactory return time though 
it could be greatly enhanced with some further optimisations. Present reducibility 
is 75% with 19 MB reduced to 4.75 MB.
Data was extracted using the VerisDB Analyst web application which analyses 
the whole dataset on the fly. The match property used is the MongoDB 3.4 imple-
mentation of $match, which contains an evaluation to be performed which has to 
be satisfied for documents to be returned. For example, this could be whether a 
specified property condition is true. The group property is simply a string repre-
sentation of a property to be aggregated and counted using a standardised query 
structure. This uses the MongoDB 3.4 implementation of $group. The sort prop-
erty contains a sub-object with a single key, value pattern. The key is the prop-
erty to sort against, the integer value indicated whether to sort in ascending or 
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descending order. The unwind property flattens arrays in the specified property 
path in the JSON hierarchy.
5  Risk assessment modelling results, summarised data fields
Figure 1 shows the results of the Monte Carlo simulation. The results were obtained 
for each type of query using the VCDB Dataset as at 20 October 2017. Data was 
obtained for actors, attack mode, the impact of any attacks and victim demograph-
ics. It should be noted that not all entries within the VCDB dataset report on all inci-
dent information. Thus, some incidents may have contained information on one field 
of interest but not on others, e.g. might report attack data but not victim data.
Any reference to banding within this section means a group of the highest fig-
ures, which when taken together in a group or “band”, have central tendency. The 
Fig. 1  The results of the Monte Carlo simulation
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central tendency was not significant of itself but represents two caveats: (i)  a col-
lection of similar occurrences may show central tendency because multiple collec-
tion fields could refer to the same overall field  (a global field) and (ii)  the central 
tendency could reflect a probabilistic confidence interval owing to a characteristic of 
the dataset which may or may not have been inferential but where there are too many 
degrees of freedom to formally prove specific inference from data properties.
There appeared to be extensive data on actors within the VCDB dataset. The 
dataset relating to actors appeared in Table 1. The dataset showed remarkable fea-
tures across all fields in respect of each actor type (internal, external or partner).
Internal actors tended to be motivated financially (602) compared to the external 
and partner actor groups. This was followed closely by the motivations of fun (200) 
which also featured strongly, corporate espionage  (63), convenience  (56) and 
grudges (48). In a large number of incidents, the motivation was not known (757). 
The dataset reported that in a large proportion of incidents the incidents were 
accidents (1703).
Figure 2 shows the actor type distribution. Typical actors were end-users (615) 
and system administrators  (93) who featured in the strongest band. This was fol-
lowed by executives (83), financiers (65), cashiers (57), managers (47) and develop-
ers (45) who were groups which lie in a similar band of prevalence.
Most external actors originated from the USA (219) and Russia (124) which were 
in the highest band. China  (53), Pakistan  (42), Great Britain  (41) and Syria  (38) 
form the second from highest band. The United Arab Emirates  (30), Turkey  (24) 
and North Korea (20) form the lowest band. There were (2975) records concerning 
external actors where the geographic origin of the attacker was not known.
The majority of actors were motivated financially  (1480), by political or reli-
gious ideology or protest  (367), espionage  (266) and fun  (211). In the 1242 inci-
dents involving external attackers, the motive of the attacker was not known. 
External actors were primarily activists  (468), independent attackers  (311), state 
affiliated (209) or the attacks took place during the commission of wider organised 
criminal offences (198). There was a secondary band of similar prevalences, which 
consisted of former employees  (57) and nation states  (39). In  2538 incidents, the 
variety of external actor was not known.
The majority of incidents where the actor was a partner of the victim involved 
originators from the USA (104). This was followed by a much smaller band, con-
sisting of Great Britain (9), India (5), Canada (4), Republic of Ireland (2) and Aus-
tralia  (2). In the majority of incidents involving partners, the geographic origin of 
the actor could not be established (213).
The majority of incidents involving partners were accidental or uninten-
tional  (179). This was followed by a strong banding of financial motivation. 
The majority of actor varieties could not be established and were recorded as 
unknown (143).
There was a considerable amount of data relating to attack modes within Table 2. 
The attacks were grouped into modes, namely error, hacking, misuse, physical, mal-
ware, social, unknown and environmental. The group featuring the largest number of 
incidents was the “error” (2038) group together with “hacking” (1927); these groups 
were relatively similar in value. The “misuse” (1409) and “physical” (1343) groups 
2651
1 3
Threats on the horizon: understanding security threats in…
formed a lower secondary banding of similar values. There was a much lower ter-
tiary banding of the groups “malware” (545) and “social” (451). The banding was 
likely to be inferential to other fields.
Table 1  Actors data in the analysed VCDB dataset
Internal External
Motive # Variety # Country # Motive # Variety #
NA 1703 Unknown 2239 Unknown 2975 Financial 1480 Unknown 2538
Unknown 757 End-user 615 US 219 Unknown 1242 Activist 468
Financial 602 Other 173 RU 124 Ideology 367 Unaffiliated 311
Fun 200 System 
admin
93 CN 53 Espionage 266 State-affili-
ated
209
Espionage 63 Executive 83 PK 42 Fun 211 Organised 
crime
198
Convenience 56 Finance 65 GB 41 Grudge 89 Former 
employee
57
Grudge 48 Cashier 57 SY 38 NA 28 Nation state 39
Other 37 Manager 47 UA 30 Other 16 Other 37
Ideology 11 Developer 45 TR 24 Secondary 8 Force 
majeure
19
Fear 3 Human 
resources
26 KP 20 Fear 3 Customer 15
Call centre 14 CA 16 Convenience 1 Competitor 12
Guard 8 IR 15 Acquaint-
ance
10
Helpdesk 8 RO 14 Terrorist 4
Maintenance 7 IN 11 Auditor 2
Auditor 4 AU 9
Partner
Country # Motive #
Unknown 213 NA 179
US 104 Unknown 143
GB 9 Financial 37
IN 5 Convenience 5
CA 4 Espionage 5
IE 2 Fun 4
AU 2 Other 3
NZ 1 Grudge 1
BH 1
JP 1
KP 1
PH 1
IT 1
DE 1
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Figure  3 shows a summary of the attack discovery method. The sample 
reported in this study was taken from incidents involving hacking. In 797 cases, 
the means of discovery were not known. Over 559 incidents were voluntarily dis-
closed by the actors in question. There were 151 incidents identified as a result of 
suspicious traffic on the network. In 86 cases, the incidents were discovered when 
employees reported observations. In 73 cases, the customer reported observations 
which led to discovery of the incident in question. HIDS detection was apparent 
in only five cases involving hacking.
The incident rate per year appeared to be latent until the rate of change in inci-
dents per year increased rapidly from 2009 (89) until 2010 (579)—this appeared 
as the first peak in Fig. 4. There was a fall in the incident rate in 2011 (537) after 
which there was a dramatic rate of change in incident rate, increasing from 1252 
in 2012 to 1907 in 2013—this forms the second peak which appeared in Fig. 4. 
The rate of change almost entirely reversed to 2014 (902) and plateaued through 
to 2015 which stayed at a steady incident rate (862) and dropped lower to (649) 
in 2016.
The financial loss per year reported in the dataset followed a logarithmic scale as 
in Fig. 5. The rate of change was relatively inconsistent from year to year but with 
an exponential increase between 2015 and 2016. The year financial loss at 2016 was 
approximately 1e10 USD. The 2016 value was an exponential increase from previ-
ous years. From 2010 to 2015, there were exponential fluctuations in what appeared 
to closely resemble a sinusoidal function. The only exception to that sinusoidal func-
tion was in 2006 (9e3 USD) where there appeared to be an exponential decrease in 
the financial loss amount in that year when compared to other years in the function.
The results pertaining to impact variety are illustrated in Fig.  6. The largest 
impact of cybersecurity incidents was in assets and fraud  (245), followed by 
Fig. 2  Attack actor type distri-
bution
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Table 2  Attack data in the analysed VCDB
Hacking
Variety # Vector # Asset
Unknown 1237 Web application 949 S—Web application 1059
Use of stolen creds 228 Unknown 713 S—Database 350
Use of backdoor or C2 195 Backdoor or C2 197 S—Unknown 287
DoS 152 Other 30 U—Desktop 238
Brute force 131 Physical access 13 P—Unknown 210
SQLi 99 Partner 10 Unknown 205
Abuse of functionality 31 Desktop sharing 10 N—Router or switch 99
Other 31 Command shell 8 U—Mobile phone 89
Forced browsing 14 VPN 5 S—Mail 59
MitM 8 3rd party desktop 2 U—POS terminal 27
XSS 6 S—POS controller 25
Buffer overflow 4 P—End-user 23
SSI injection 4 S—File 23
Physical
Variety # Vector # Asset
Theft 1041 Unknown 454 U—Laptop 480
Disabled controls 275 Victim work area 300 M—Documents 240
Tampering 175 Personal vehicle 166 T—ATM 156
Skimmer 72 Victim public area 105 U—Desktop 152
Bypassed controls 62 Victim grounds 64 M—Flash drive 66
Surveillance 49 Partner facility 63 T—Gas terminal 53
Assault 29 Public facility 58 M—Disk drive 50
Snooping 7 Personal residence 53 Unknown 38
Unknown 6 Victim secure area 42 S—Unknown 37
Destruction 3 Partner vehicle 22 S—Database 27
Connection 3 Public vehicle 11 M—Unknown 20
Wiretapping 3 Other 7 M—Tapes 20
Other 1 Uncontrolled location 5 U—Unknown 18
Error
Variety # Vector # Asset
Misdelivery 845 Unknown 1158 M—Documents 1071
Loss 367 Carelessness 820 S—Web application 211
Publishing error 285 Inadequate processes 41 U—Desktop 132
Disposal error 277 Random error 11 S—Database 115
Misconfiguration 81 Inadequate technology 8 M—Flash drive 82
Unknown 45 Other 5 S—Mail 73
Gaffe 33 Inadequate personnel 3 M—Disk media 61
Other 33 Unknown 60
Malfunction 31 S—File 52
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Table 2  (continued)
Error
Variety # Vector # Asset
Programming error 31 S—Unknown 51
Omission 22 U—Laptop 32
Classification error 4 M—Tapes 24
Data entry error 4 M—Disk drive 23
Malware
Variety # Vector # Asset #
Backdoor 229 Unknown 231 U—Desktop 281
C2 197 Email attachment 208 P—Unknown 217
Capture stored data 179 Direct install 64 S—Unknown 201
Downloader 176 Web drive-by 24 N—Router or switch 96
Unknown 146 Email link 9 U—Mobile phone 89
Spyware/Keylogger 141 Download by malware 5 S—Web application 82
Export data 116 Remote injection 4 Unknown 47
Scan network 106 Email autoexecute 4 S—Database 47
Exploit vuln 91 Other 3 U—POS terminal 39
Brute force 88 Removable media 2 P—End-user 29
Disable controls 76 Software update 2 P—System admin 22
Ransomware 67 Network propagation 1 U—Laptop 21
Other 64 Web download 1 S—POS controller 20
Social
Variety # Vector # Asset #
Phishing 302 Email 307 P—Unknown 301
Bribery 46 Unknown 63 U—Desktop 246
Pretexting 35 In-person 44 S—Unknown 182
Extortion 30 Phone 15 N—Router or switch 95
Forgery 16 Documents 13 U—Mobile phone 89
Unknown 15 SMS 12 P—End-user 73
Influence 11 Software 11 S—Database 63
Other 9 Website 5 S—Web application 54
Elicitation 2 Social media 3 P—System admin 25
Baiting 2 IM 1 Unknown 23
Propaganda 2 Removable media 1 S—Mail 22
Spam 1 M—Documents 21
Scam 1 P—Executive 21
Misuse
Variety # Vector # Asset
Privilege abuse 977 LAN access 895 S—Database 699
Possession abuse 194 Physical access 323 Unknown 190
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legal and regulatory (226), response and recovery (172) and brand damage (136). 
These impact values cover the period 1972 to 2016.
An illustration of the results for impact rating is provided in Fig. 7. For most 
incidents, the true impact rating was not fully understood  (599). There were 14 
incidents rated as having a major impact, 31 incidents were rated as being moder-
ate, 274 minor and 244 were rated as having no impact at all, i.e. null.
Victim demographics appear in Table  3. The most common country of vic-
tims was the USA  (5121) followed by Great Britain  (416), Canada (243) and 
Australia (96). Of all incidents, 169 were geographically unknown. Most victim 
organisations  (990) had an employee count of over 100,000. Slightly less than 
this, 923 had an employee count of 1001 to 10,000. Those with 101 to 1000 
employees sustained  700 incidents. Nine hundred thirty-eight victim organi-
sations had between 1 and 100 employees. The majority of industries affected 
appeared to be in the public sector, with commercial bank (196) and Internet pub-
lishing (147) following marginally.
Table 2  (continued)
Misuse
Variety # Vector # Asset
Data mishandling 157 Unknown 165 M—Documents 180
Knowledge abuse 150 Remote access 40 M—Payment card 71
Unapproved hardware 49 Non-corporate 28 S—Unknown 68
Unknown 46 Other 20 U—Desktop 56
Email misuse 23 S—Mail 46
Unapproved workaround 15 S—Web application 36
Net misuse 11 P—Unknown 36
Unapproved software 7 M—Unknown 25
Illicit content 5 P—End-user 24
Other 4 M—Flash drive 18
U—Laptop 18
Environmental Total
Vector # Asset # Type #
Unknown 3 S—Unknown 3 error 2038
Power failure 2 S—Web application 2 hacking 1927
Fire 1 N—Router or switch 2 misuse 1409
Humidity 1 S—Mail 1 physical 1343
Unknown 1 malware 545
S—Database 1 social 451
S—File 1 unknown 224
N—LAN 1 environmental 7
**Data as at 20 October 2017
2656 S. Walker-Roberts et al.
1 3
6  Discussion
It is striking from an analysis of the dataset that despite the data being collected 
through the open-source community, it appears to represent the picture one might 
expect to see based upon the malicious trends industries are actively working to 
address.
Fig. 3  A summary of the attack discovery method in the studied dataset
Fig. 4  The number of security incidents per year
2657
1 3
Threats on the horizon: understanding security threats in…
6.1  Frequency of internal attacks
The dataset shows that from 1972 to 2016, overall the number of internal actors and 
the number of external actors are roughly equal. This is important because computer 
systems are designed to mitigate threats from the outside inward, not usually the 
other way around [18]. The traditional view of computer security is that it should 
be organised like an onion with layers of security zones [8]. These configurations 
clearly have not mitigated the threats in this study as depicted in Fig. 3.
It is notable that the majority of internal attackers were end-users and system 
administrators, the two staff groups most trusted in a computing environment. 
Whilst the motivation in many attacks was not known, the majority of attacks were 
financially motivated. Another large proportion of attacks are noted as having been 
Fig. 5  The financial loss per year reported in the dataset
Fig. 6  The results pertaining to security incident impact variety
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carried out for fun. Both of these findings are remarkable. These trends are likely 
a result of the increasing adoption and use of computer technologies to solve an 
increasing number of problems that were previously done offline. It appears that the 
increasing adoption of computers has led to a widened opportunity for attacks to 
take place.
6.2  Increasing rate and loss
It is apparent in Fig.  4 that cybersecurity incidents have dramatically increased 
since 2010. It is notable that this is approximately around the time of mass cloud 
Fig. 7  An illustration of the results (summarised in Fig. 6) for impact rating
Table 3  Victim demographics data
** Data as at 20 October 2017
Victims
Country # Employee Count # Industry #
US 5121 Unknown 2458 Administration of Veterans’ Affairs 885
GB 416 Over 100,000 990 General medical and surgical hospitals 692
CA 243 1001 to 10,000 923 Offices of physicians (except mental health special-
ists)
334
Unknown 169 101 to 1000 700 Colleges, universities and professional schools 210
AU 96 11 to 100 558 Commercial Banking 196
NZ 73 1 to 10 380 N/A 187
IN 71 10,001 to 25,000 287 Internet publishing and broadcasting and web search 
portals
147
IE 48 Small 246 Administration of Public Health Programs 140
JP 44 Large 191 Direct health and medical insurance carriers 119
KR 41 25,001 to 50,000 160 Public administration 116
DE 40 50,001 to 100,000 101 Executive offices 116
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technology adoption and the general move towards Internet services [22]. The 
exponentially increasing incident rate from 2010 to 2013 is suggestive of a gauging 
exercise within computer security in which the dramatic change in the yearly rate 
of adoption of online services was too rapid for computer scientists and computer 
users to keep up technologically with what clearly appears to be a widened oppor-
tunity for malicious activity. Though the incident rate appears to drop, the amount 
of loss occurring per year is increasing exponentially. Figure 5 appears to represent 
a substantial sinusoidal pattern about 1e8 which appears to scale down towards 2e8 
before the annual loss figure rapidly increases to 1e12.
6.3  Principle of least privilege
The statistical distributions in Table  2 are indicative of what can be expected 
based upon the state of the art, which is potentially suggestive of the accuracy of 
VCDB. The dataset tends to show that there is a direct relation between the mode 
of attack and the mode of use; in fact, they are the same in most cases. For exam-
ple, in Table 2, malware and hacking have strong relations to backdoors left by sys-
tem administrators. Misuse incidents frequently present as being a result of privi-
lege abuse. Social incidents tend to be as a result of phishing. The most common 
error incidents involve misdelivery of confidential information. It is clear that in 
each case, the usage of a computer system is often its means of exploitation and 
destruction.
This closely ties with [24], which is the seminal piece of work in computer secu-
rity that defined the principle of least privilege  (POLP). The principle echoes the 
patterns that can be observed in Table 2. Given what can be observed, POLP is not 
enough in principle to secure a computer system. This is because, according to the 
dataset, even a design which follows POLP is still vulnerable because it can still be 
misused to some extent. The vulnerability lies in the ability of use, which POLP 
cannot address. Given that POLP is the most popular design pattern for a computer 
security configuration [25], this is a serious problem. Following this design pattern 
means that usability and access are a direct trade-off for security, which is a highly 
unsatisfactory position resulting in the shortcomings that can be observed, depend-
ing on where the balance falls during design.
6.4  The role of human error
The majority of attack modes relate to functional work and access arrangements for 
computer systems. The vectors for each attack mode show in clarity that these inci-
dents are a result of bad practices, for example sending confidential information in 
a way that poses a risk of misdelivery. However, not all vectors appear to relate to 
user error but to the mode of use itself. All modes of attack appear to be an overall 
abuse of the privilege of being able to use the computer system, not any specific per-
mission target. In these cases, it is not always possible to accurately determine fault 
because fault itself may be a philosophical question.
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The recurring theme of data stores as an affected asset (documents and databases) 
seems to indicate that the object of cybersecurity incidents is information. This 
agrees with the well-known position that data is one of the most valuable assets in 
hi-tech economies. Thus, it can be properly concluded that if abuse of privilege is 
the means to procure those documents, then privilege itself is the incurable vulner-
ability. It is, in effect, a vulnerability which cannot be patched because by so doing, 
the computer system would be rendered unusable for the purpose intended. This 
begs the question of how and by what means security will not be a trade-off with 
functionality.
6.5  Criticality
The results for Tables 1 and 2 are organised in bands of criticality. This was spon-
taneous and not a result of placement. The most important criticalities are that in 
the majority of fields, important information was unknown. It is impossible to say 
with any degree of precision that this is for any specific reason, but it is likely that 
this is an indicator of successful repudiation. It is a concerning pattern that success-
ful repudiation could feature significantly and suggests that current technology is 
unable to deal with the scale of malicious activity which organisations are facing.
Geographic criticalities are extremely important. The majority of victims seem to 
be located within western states, though this could be because information relating 
to other states is kept confidential. Those organisations on the extremes of size (the 
largest and smallest) in terms of employee count appear to be more vulnerable than 
others to cybersecurity incidents. This is likely to be because in a small organisation, 
it is probably financially less capable for the purposes of investment in cybersecurity 
and has less access to expertise than a larger organisation. In the largest organisa-
tions, it is likely to be very difficult to detect breaches and to mitigate a potentially 
higher rate of internal malicious activity. The scalability of computer security infra-
structures is a known problem within the literature [10].
The most frequent assets targeted are documents, personal computers, databases 
and web applications. This is not surprising because each asset usually has to be 
compromised carefully in tandem in order to obtain the confidential documents. The 
attack methods tend to reflect the type of incident involved, in particular the public 
sector is affected the most by cybersecurity incidents followed by commercial bank-
ing, with both having greater criticality—this is probably because they are ideal tar-
gets given that the dominant motivations in the results seem to be financial and the 
asset targeted tends to be documents storing confidential information.
The majority of actors seem to come from the USA and Russia. Other strongly 
featuring geographic originators are countries with which there are known political 
and military conflicts, e.g. Syria, and so their presence among the results is not sur-
prising. Most internal threats showed criticality in the end-user and financial motive, 
whereas external threats showed greater criticality in activism and nation state activ-
ity. This is consistent with what one might expect based on the state of global affairs.
The mode of attack and vectors tend to demonstrate a logical consistency with 
what is known about cyberattack patterns. For example, statistically phishing was 
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strongly associated with the vector of email. The vector in most attack modes was 
not known. Those vectors and attack modes showing greatest criticality were phys-
ical access, email and LAN access/backdoors. The attack modes showed greatest 
criticality in carelessness and privilege abuse—this ties in closely with established 
cybersecurity best practices and known modes of attack. This is concerning because 
the attack rates are still remarkably high even though there are well known mitiga-
tions against the same.
Moreover, this data adds to the perspective [2] that existing means of securing 
computer systems cannot 100% guarantee detection and mitigation of every threat. 
Though at first glance it may appear as though incident rates are decreasing, loss is 
increasing exponentially which challenges the very foundations of computer secu-
rity. It suggests attackers are doing more damage through fewer activities and are 
thus becoming rapidly more capable.
7  Summary and conclusion
The objective of this research was to identify important trends amongst the largest 
publicly available dataset for cybersecurity. It also aimed to investigate the degree of 
randomness and the probability of extreme possibilities occurring in cybersecurity 
incidents; these incidents associated with the VCDB dataset because it is the largest 
cybersecurity incident dataset which is publicly available. This has been achieved 
with successful Monte Carlo simulation and by implementing a MapReduce func-
tion to take a sizeable JSON dataset and summarise it to respond to realtime que-
ries from a web application. The general patterns identified from the MapReduce 
process were that there is a major increase in financial loss as a result of incidents, 
which are increasing in prevalence. It is becoming increasingly common for inci-
dents to be internal in origin. It is becoming more popular for nation states to engage 
in acts of cyber warfare. In general, the trend appears to be that cybersecurity inci-
dents are motivated either by ideology or financial motivation. It is to be expected 
that loss will continue to increase, prevalence will increase and the role of nation 
states in cyberattacks is likely to increase.
From the analysis in this study, it appears that the challenge faced by cybersecu-
rity is on a theoretical battle ground. Present ways of thinking about cybersecurity 
trade usability with security. For instance, generalised access alone is a violation of 
Saltzer’s principle of least privilege [24]. The balance between usability and secu-
rity is, it is submitted, the source of the prevalence of modern cyberattacks. The 
field of computer security needs a fundamental way of providing access with a usa-
ble experience and implementation of the functional requirements intended, without 
any implication for security. In order to achieve that there needs to be a theoretical 
rethink of cybersecurity.
Multiple temporal datasets also need to be compared together with data which is 
more recent in order to understand the most recent security incident trends and the 
underlying social reasons for them as opposed to statistics in isolation. We provide a 
model from which this exercise can be executed repeatedly and reliably against the 
same and other datasets.
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The types of attacks studied in this paper shows an increasing exploitation of 
vulnerabilities that are almost “extinct” in classical computing environments. This 
can be explained by the immature security mechanisms in Supervisory Control and 
Data Acquisition Systems (SCADA) networks which employs a number of purpose-
built protocols such as DNP3, Modbus and BACnet. Often, the security protocols 
deployed in CPS are not corresponding with their criticality or they even they lack 
any security protection mechanism. Many of the potential attacks on CPS and IoT 
devices can be prevented using anomaly and/or intrusion detection systems; none-
theless, these are vulnerable to statistical induction as established in [30]. However, 
there is a need for tailored innovative security and management mechanisms at the 
device-level to enhance CPS resilience.
Detailed patterns of activity reflecting the motivations of attackers need to be 
explored in order to understand specific types of cyberattacks. Theory then needs 
to be shaped to those realities. A significant amount of future academic research 
needs to build further datasets tailored to specific modes of enquiry. Research is also 
required to develop new mechanisms for the prevention of cybersecurity incidents.
It is submitted that based upon the patterns observed in this research, there needs 
to be a greater understanding of how the stand-off between functional requirements 
and security can be addressed, particularly in CPS. It is apparent that functional 
requirements can and often do require a trade with security, and the relationship is 
directly proportionate. Yet in industry there is a very high motivation for features in 
pressured commercial environments where new features are required often to remain 
competitive. The pressure to release new features classically results in security being 
secondary. This is one area which requires further analysis and research.
“Zero trust” or trustless computing is also a key emerging paradigm which 
changes the approach taken to cybersecurity generally. However, it has so far been 
the child of commercial research organisations with little output from academia. 
Academically rigorous outputs in relation to zero trust are required so that it can 
be applied in situations where classical application of cybersecurity mitigations are 
impractical, such as in the case of IIoT where devices may not have enough com-
putational power to encrypt data. Examples of such emerging research in academic 
includes [31].
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